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Abstract 
This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the financial patterns of non-financial 
European firms for seven Continental European countries and the period 1991-2001. Our 
analytical framework departs from the common one as we consider that long-term and short-
term sources of funds have to be analysed separately. Using the BACH database, principal 
component analysis, cluster analysis and econometrical tests are carried out in order to test for 
two hypotheses : i) there is a tendency toward grouping around a common corporate financial 
pattern; ii) there is a general tendency across countries toward less bank financing. We find 
that differences between European countries remain highly significant so that the first 
hypothesis is not validated. The second hypothesis is rejected with the long-term 
intermediation ratio but validated with the short-term one. Indeed, econometrical tests lead to 
a strong conclusion : the existence of a common trend toward disintermediation of short-term 
financing. The banking function of allocating liquidity for day-to-day business and providing 
a certain liquidity insurance to firms is declining whatever the size of firms.  
 
 
JEL classification codes : G 20, G 21 
 
Keywords : corporate financial structure, BACH database, European convergence, 
financial intermediation, liquidity insurance. 
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1. Introduction  
 
For the past twenty years, cross-country studies of the patterns of corporate financing have 
been dominated by the idea that differences can be explained by two ideal-types of financial 
systems : securities markets-based systems, such as in Great Britain and the United States, 
bank-based systems, such as in Germany. This standard distinction is becoming widely 
controversial (Carlin and Mayer, 2000), as empirical works suggest a reality more complex 
than the model. The conventional view being no more the panacea, new analytical 
frameworks are needed in order to study corporate financing in developed countries. We 
propose an original framework : corporate sources of funds are distinguished according to 
their nature (equity versus debt) and to their maturity (long-term versus short-term debt). 
Hence, our taxonomy is more complex than the conventional binary one. We put forward this 
framework because we consider that diversity among financial corporate patterns is larger 
than expected by the mainstream literature. However, we assume that only a limited number 
of sustainable models can coexist. This view challenges the idea of a single and optimal 
model – the market-based – which should dominate others. It also puts into question the idea 
that financial systems are converging towards a single pattern, brought by globalisation. 
Using the BACH database, empirical tests are carried out. Our database includes seven 
continental European countries and covers the period 1991-2001. We are aware that empirical 
findings are highly sensitive to empirical choices. As there are several sources of external 
funds, ranging from issued equities to trade credit, corporate financial patterns cannot be 
easily identified in a cross-country comparison. Empirical findings are also highly sensitive to 
the kind of data (flow of funds or balance sheet, aggregate or individual data) and to the rate 
of coverage of the sample, firms having distinct financial patterns according to the size. It 
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explains why empirical studies in that field cannot be easily compared and why quantitative 
studies remain rather inconclusive (see table A. 1 in appendix).  
This paper is structured as follows. The theoretical and empirical analytical frameworks are 
displayed in section 2. In section 3-5, we address three sets of questions: What can we learn 
from corporate financial patterns ? Do we find cross-country significant differences in the 
source of corporate funds? (section 3) Is there any pattern which supports higher 
performances ? Is there any model to be followed by European firms ? (section 4). Does 
empirical evidence testify in favour of the assumption that national financial systems are 
converging? Is there a general tendency towards less bank financing ? (section 5) Conclusions 
are drawn in section 6.  
 
2. The theoretical and empirical analytical frameworks 
 
2.1 The theoretical analytical framework 
 
Few studies discriminate sources of funds according to the term (Demirgüç-Kunt et 
Maksimovic,1999). Why do we consider that it is important to deal with firm debt maturity ? 
In our view, firms have to cope with distinct problems which have not the same temporal 
horizon. Corporate managers have to decide and implement long-term planned investments 
which are risky and to react to day-to-day events which can be unexpected and, hence, 
uncertain. It is assumed that financial patterns are better analysed when two capacities are 
taken into account: the ability to finance risky investment projects and the fitness to be 
flexible, i.e. to react to contingent events that can be good or bad for the future of the firm 
(table 1). Financing problems can be raised by long-term planned expenses as well as by 
unexpected financial consequences of bad or good events. Indeed, a recession and a dramatic 
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growth of the turnover are both the causes of liquidity problem. From this viewpoint, a given 
corporate financing pattern is seen as a specific way of dealing with risk and uncertainty. 
Therefore, the effect that the capital structure may have on corporate dynamism must take into 
account not only the long-term pattern of financing but also the short-term one.  
Two dimensions matter: to fund long-term investment, corporate funding can rely either on 
equity or on long-term debt, to be flexible, financing comes either from stable resources or 
from short-term debt. Stable resources, also called permanent funds, are a part of total 
resources and have several sources: i) equity, ii) long-term1 financial debt, that comes either 
from financial institutions, mostly banks, or markets, and iii) provisions. Stable resources are 
required to finance investment and are sometimes used for funding current expenses; in the 
extreme case of non-profitable enterprises backed by venture capital, wage expenses are 
covered by permanent funds. Firms may hold substantial cash reserves to face a liquidity 
shortage and have the internal capacity to react to unexpected events resulting in a need for 
additional capital. Short-term debt granted by banks to firms is the main external resource. It 
can be made available quickly and at a reasonable cost if there is an explicit or sometimes 
implicit agreement with bankers.  
Theoretically, banks and markets perform two distinct functions: they provide stable 
resources to finance risky and planned investment and a certain liquidity insurance that helps 
firms to face current business events, this liquidity promise depends on private information 
(bank) and on public information (market) about firms. However, in European countries, 
markets only perform the first function, as only a few non-financial firms issue short-term 
securities on financial markets.  
                                                 
1 In this paper, the term ‘long-term debt’ is employed instead of ‘medium- and long-term debt’. 
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Using financial statements, we try to observe how firms are able to secure long-term financial 
needs and short-term ones. As we consider that the distinction between equity and debt is, of 
course, relevant and that long-term and short-term sources of funds have to be analysed 
separately, two pairs of key criteria are selected : the long-term debt ratio versus equity ratio 
and the short-term financial debt ratio versus the stable resources ratio. If the long-term 
financing patterns and the short-term ones are independent, then four corporate financial 
patterns can be distinguished (table 2). In countries where long- and short-term debt are major 
sources of financing, the national financial pattern can be depicted as debt-oriented whereas 
in countries where firms rely on equity and are able to secure a high degree of stable resources 
for current activity, the national financial pattern is depicted as autonomy- and equity-
oriented. This typology includes two other cases: in countries where firms on the average 
have a rather low long-term debt ratio but a high rate of net short-term financial debt, the 
financial pattern is overdraft-oriented; in countries where firms rely on a high long-term debt 
ratio and obtain a high degree of stable resources for funding current activity, that correlates 
with a low short-term bank debt, the financial pattern is autonomy-oriented. Autonomy-
oriented firms have a higher internal capacity than their counterparts to finance current 
activity and to be flexible.  
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Table 2: Four corporate financial patterns 
 
  Short-term financial debt ratio 
  + - 
 
+ 
 
Debt-oriented 
 
Autonomy-oriented 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
  
- 
 
Overdraft-oriented 
 
 
Autonomy- and 
equity-oriented 
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2.2 The selected database 
The selected database strongly influences empirical findings. The difficulty of testing theories 
of corporate financing by using national aggregate data has been discussed before (Corbett 
and Jenkinson, 1996). Datasets developed on the basis of corporate financial statements are 
more appropriate as they can be broken down by firms size. SMEs matter because they are 
often more typical as their scope of sources of funds is more limited. If one only looks at the 
country effect and ignores the size effect, then average values are determined by the largest 
firms; this bias is amplified by using databases including only firms which have gone public 
or only national accounts flow of funds data. In cross-country studies the degree of 
comparability of national databases also matters. Being limited to the available databases 
forces some compromises : financial statements data are issued from the BACH database, 
which is, by far, the most harmonized database with a rather good coverage rate, even if 
imperfections remain2. However, it is a dataset of semi-aggregate data made up of averages 
by country, year, sector and size, which does not provide firm level balance sheets.  
The Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised (BACH) is the result of a close 
cooperation between both the European Commission and the European Committee of Central 
Balance-sheet, which is responsible for the aggregation of financial data of non-financial 
firms. For members of the European Union this information has been harmonised (see 
appendix 2). Other studies of the financial structure of European firms also use this database 
(Rivaud-Danset et al., 2001, Gallizo and Salvador, 2002, Paulet, 2003, and Cobham, 2004). 
The BACH database contains information by year, country, size and sector. Data contained in 
the database for the manufacturing sector have a higher quality than data for other sectors, and 
our investigation focuses on this industrial sector. This study covers the 1991-2001 period. In 
order to control for comparability, it is based on seven European countries only. Austria, 
                                                 
2 The coverage of the sample firms of the BACH database is assessed by Cobham (2004). 
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Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden are the seven countries for which 
complete or nearly complete data are available for all the sectors 3.   
 
2.3 The data analysis method 
To address the question of convergence, two suitable statistical methods are performed: the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the Cluster Analysis (CA)4.  
Principal component analysis is helpful when several criteria are used to discriminate between 
data and when the sample is large. The data analysis covers an eleven year period, data being 
broken down by size (three sizes) and sectors: three sub-sectors when only the manufacturing 
industries are selected (651 observations), eleven sectors and sub-sectors when all the sectors 
are taken into account (2387 observations). PCA provides global images of the main dataset 
features. To each individual data or ‘observation’ (i) is associated a set of (K) numeric 
variables which can be displayed by a scatter of points, iN , in a space
KR with K 
dimensions. PCA looks for the best orientations of KR and reduces the number of selected 
variables – called ‘active variables’ – to a few independent and hence orthogonal components, 
also called factorial axes. The best factorial axe has the highest capacity for explaining the 
diversity between basic data, measured by the variance. Two factorial axes shape a figure on 
which iN  can be plotted. Hence, projections on this two-dimensional space allow us to 
visualize the grouping of observations, making the results more explicit. Each data has a code, 
for instance 91 SW 1 21 means Swedish (SW) small firms (1), producing intermediary 
manufacturing goods (21) in 1991. The most representative (atypical) firms of the sample are 
located near (far from) the intersection of the factorial axes. Visualizing the pair of factorial 
                                                 
3 The small Austrian firms are not in the sample, due to missing data in BACH. Data are not available for  
German firms after 2000. 
4 For more details about these methods, see Volle (1997). 
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axes is however only a limited step of the analysis, while looking at the statistical evidence is 
by far the most important step. 
Cluster analysis is also important and is often used as a companion of PCA. It sorts the output 
dataset according to each of the large components and permits the grouping of data that are 
most similar (a standard iterated algorithm is used to minimize the sum of squared distances 
from the cluster means). Cluster analysis makes sure that scatters of points that are grouped 
are close to each other in the space KR  and not only in a two-components space.  
Table 3 gives the list of selected variables that enter into the data analysis, and their definition 
according to the BACH conventions (these are ratios of means since the BACH database only 
contains aggregate data). It is assumed in this paper that the same level of economic 
profitability can be achieved following different financial patterns. In order to test this 
assumption, the ratios which characterize the sources of funds are distinguished from the 
ratios used to identify economic and financial performances: the set of balance-sheet ratios are 
treated by the PCA as active variables and the set of performance ratios are treated as 
supplementary variables5. Active variables have been selected in order to contrast : 
- firms with a higher level of equity and those with a higher level of long-term financial 
indebtedness, 
- firms with a higher rate of stable resources and those with a higher rate of short-term 
financial debt.  
This set of ratios has been used in a previous study to compare the financial structures of 
SMEs and large firms within the EU (Rivaud-Danset et al., 2001). It is partly distinct from 
the set of ratios selected as indicators of the evolution of corporate financial patterns by 
                                                 
5 Supplementary variables contribute neither to the definition of factorial axes nor to the grouping of data. 
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other studies using the BACH database (European Economy, supplement A, various 
issues; Gallizo and Salvador, 2002 6).  
 
Table 3 : Selected variables of the data analysis 
Active variables  
‘Equity’ = Capital and reserves / Total balance-sheet   
‘Leverage’ = Provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities / (Capital and reserves + provisions and 
medium and long-term liabilities) 
‘ReserveRate’ = Reserves / Capital and reserves  
‘Fidebtstruct’ = Financial debt / Medium- and long-term liabilities  
‘Overdraft ‘= [Short-term financial debt - (current investment + cash at bank and in hand)] / Total 
liabilities 
‘Autonomy’ = [(Capital and reserves + provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities) – (fixed 
assets + working capital requirement)]/ Turnover 
‘Nonfidebtrate’ = [Trade credits + payments received on accounts of orders] / Short-term liabilities  
 
Supplementary variables  
‘CashFlowCap’ = Cash flow / Turnover 
‘ROE’ = Return on equity = Cash flow / Capital and reserves 
‘GrosProfita’ = Gross operating profit / (Fixed assets + working capital requirement) 
‘Markup’ = Gross operating profit / Turnover 
‘Fixasset’ = Fixed assets / Turnover 
‘WorkingK’ = Working capital requirement / Turnover  
 ‘Financialcharges’ = Interests and similar charges / Turnover 
‘Solvency’ = Cash flow / Financial debt  
‘Appint’ = Apparent interest rate = Interests and similar charges / Financial debt 
                                                 
6 Gallizo and Salvador (2002) use a widely different set of active variables as it includes, along with financial 
indicators, indicators of the productive pattern and economic performances. 
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3. What can we learn from corporate financial patterns?  
 
At a first step we use the largest database, that includes all sectors over the period 1991-2001. 
When the data of this sample are projected on the figure shaped by the first pair of factorial 
axes of the PCA, similarities or differences across countries or across size and industry cannot 
be showed clearly. The metaphor of the bicycle race allows us to describe the lack of evidence 
from the PCA. Runners can be divided into two asymmetrical groups: the bulk of not-easily 
identified runners and a very small number of identified runners. If the leaders do not share 
any common features, as they cannot be grouped either by nationality or by team, 
commentators would regard them only as individuals. We have a similar case here. The 
individual data the coordinates of which have the biggest weight in the definition of the 
factorial axes are similar to leaders in a bicycle race. In our case, leaders do not share any 
common feature. The bulk is constituted by data the coordinates of which have the smallest 
weight in the definition of the axes; it is concentrated near the barycentre, i.e. the intersection 
of the first pair of factorial axes. When all the sectors are taken into account, the diversity 
among the ‘leaders’ is high, while the number of firms near the barycentre is too large and the 
PCA does not provide some of the insights that one could expect.  
Cluster analysis outcomes suggest a diversity among the Continental European Union 
economies and do not testify to a standardization of corporate financial patterns across 
countries. Data are grouped in three clusters. Firms of the one country are not equally found 
in each of the three clusters. As an extreme example, cluster 1 does not include any French 
firm. A few sectors have a higher frequency in one cluster than in others, but we observe 
neither an overall ‘sector effect’ nor an overall ‘country effect’. Because of the strong 
diversity of sectors, it is not easy to get more clear-cut results and  we cannot answer the 
 14
question addressed in this section. The sample needs to be more homogeneous as regards the 
sector. Yet in the following subsections the database only includes manufacturing sectors.  
When the database is limited to manufacturing industries only (fig. 1-3), then similarities 
and differences among the financial patterns can easily be observed. Statistical outcomes are 
displayed in Appendix 3. Overall results of the PCA are the following. The first pair of 
factorial axes provides a good summary of the data as it explains 63 % of the total variance, 
while the first three factorial axes explain 80 % of the variance. A good quality of the data 
analysis is to be expected, because the number of active variables is small and some of them 
correlate negatively, by definition. The coordinates of the first factorial axe indicate that firms 
with a high ratio of stable resources (‘autonomy’, see table 3) contrast with those having a 
high ratio of net short-term financial debt (‘overdraft’) (fig. 1). The second axe depicts a 
contrast between firms with a high ratio of long-term debt (‘leverage’) and those with a high 
ratio of own funds (‘equity’). These oppositions are not surprising. The most striking feature 
is the independence of the two pairs of variables: ‘autonomy’ versus ‘overdraft’ and 
‘leverage’ versus ‘equity’. By plotting the first and second factorial axes, this independence is 
visualized on figure 1. These four variables are the most discriminating, along with the 
financial debt structure ratio (‘fidebtstruct’), that by definition positively correlates with the 
ratio called ‘overdraft’.  
 15
Figure 1: Active and supplementary variables* plotted on the first pair of factorial axes 
manufacturing firms, 1991-2001 
 
 
*supplementary variables are in italics. Source : own calculations 
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Figure 1 indicates that firms with a higher rate of own funds (equity) than other firms of the 
sample  as well as firms with a higher rate of long-term debt (leverage) finance the operating 
cycle in an undetermined manner : the two modes, either keeping cash and current financial 
assets (‘autonomy’), or short-term borrowing from markets and banks (‘overdraft’) are 
observed. A higher level of net short-term financial debt (‘overdraft’) does not entail a higher 
level of long-term indebtedness (‘leverage’), as indicated by the lack of correlation between 
these two variables (correlation equals 0.01). Independency of these two sets of criteria is a 
sound result. The same evidence has been produced when all sectors were taken into account 
(supra) and in previous studies (Rivaud-Danset et al. 2001). It validates the view that national 
financial 
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systems are better characterized by using these two pairs of criteria than by using only one 
pair. It also validates our theoretical analytical framework : the financial pattern of long-term 
investment projects and the financial pattern of day-to-day business are not similar.
When the database only includes manufacturing, we get a more homogeneous sample that 
allows us to see the grouping of individual data by country. Figures 2 and 3 testify in favour 
of the notion of a national financial system, as illustrated by the following example: the 
average small German firm producing consumer goods is more similar to the average large 
German firms producing investment goods, whatever the year, than to its French counterpart. 
When the database is limited to manufacturing industries, then significant country differences 
can be observed. 
 
4. Is there any model to be followed by European firms? 
 
The results of the PCA and the cluster analysis provide arguments to discuss the widely held 
belief in a single corporate model that would favour economic growth. In this section limited 
to manufacturing firms, we take into account profitability indicators that are classified as 
supplementary variables in the PCA (see table 3). Figure 1 shows that gross profitability and 
mark-up ratios are located not far from the barycentre, suggesting a rather loose correlation 
between a given financial pattern and economic profitability. This outcome testifies in favour 
of the idea that different financial patterns constitute different ways of achieving similar 
performances, performances being estimated, here, only by indicators of economic 
profitability. Differences in corporate financial patterns among firms do not necessarily imply 
the superiority of one type of system over others. This view is shared with researchers who 
follow a systemic perspective and reject the agency theory view of an optimal corporate 
governance system (Aoki, 2001, Schmidt and Tyrell, 2004).  
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The cluster analysis provides additional evidence. It indicates that there are distinct modes of 
financing which are more or less sustainable. Observations are grouped into three clusters. 
The hand made figure 3 has been introduced as a pedagogical device. The framework 
summarized by table 2 is a good guide to comment figures 2 and 3. Outcomes are displayed in 
appendix 4. 
Cluster 1 groups firms that belong to a debt-oriented pattern. Short-term and long-term bank 
debt is the preferred source of funds. A high percentage of the German and Austrian firms 
belong to this cluster. Cluster 1 also includes half of the Swedish firms and, more accurately, 
the Swedish firms at the beginning of the 1990s. The set of variables with values significantly 
higher or lower than the average of the sample is the following: the rate of long-term 
liabilities (‘leverage’) and the rate of short-term financial debt (‘overdraft’) are higher, the 
rate of trade credit (‘nonfidebtrate’) is lower; in spite of slightly lower economic 
performances, as indicated by lower gross profitability and mark-up ratios, return on equity 
(ROE) is higher because of the leverage effect. It is necessary to recall that the ratio called 
‘leverage’ includes all stable resources that are not equity, and in particular it includes 
provisions. The rate of provisions is structurally very high in Austria and Germany because of 
the pension funds internally managed by firms for their employees. Cluster 1 looks like a 
classical case study, as it illustrates the positive effect of debt on the return on equity ratio, but 
its impact on economic growth is not defined.  
Cluster 2 illustrates an overdraft-oriented pattern. It groups nearly all the Italian firms and 70 
% of the Spanish firms of the sample. The ratio called ‘overdraft’ is much higher than the 
average, while ‘leverage’ is lower. The set of variables, which characterizes this cluster, does 
not testify to a classical corporate model. Firms rely on short-term debt. The apparent rate of 
interest and the financial charges ratio are higher, ROE being lower. Clearly, this atypical 
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complex set of variables is not an optimal one. Nevertheless, Italian firms have followed this 
pattern over the whole period, and this fact suggests that it has also some advantages for them.  
Cluster 3 illustrates an ‘autonomy- and equity-oriented’ pattern. All the French firms and 
nearly all the Belgian ones belong to this cluster. The indicator called ‘autonomy’ has 
negative values in all the clusters, because stable resources never entirely cover fixed assets 
and the working capital requirement. However, the negative value of this ratio is lower in 
cluster 3 than in clusters 1 and 2. ‘Leverage’ is lower than the average while the rate of equity 
is higher. ‘Overdraft’ has a negative value and is lower than on average while the rate of trade 
credit is higher. The cash-flow capacity ratio and the gross profitability ratio are slightly, 
although significantly, higher in cluster 3 than on the average. 
Is cluster 3 the model to be followed? Economic profitability being slightly higher, can we 
predict that firms belonging to this cluster have a bigger capacity to expand than other firms 
of the sample?  
If we consider that firms have a large choice of sources of funds, internal and external, and 
that the deregulation of financial markets made possible the development of alternative 
instruments to bank debt, then the question has little value. In the Modigliani-Miller world, it 
has no value because all profitable projects would be funded, whatever the characteristics of 
the firms are. Following the pecking order approach of Myers and Majluf (1984), who 
demonstrated why corporate managers prefer to finance investment with internal funds, 
because of the asymmetry of information problem, the answer is ambiguous. In a Myers and 
Majluf world, which is closer to the real world than the Modigliani-Miller one, the choice is 
hierarchical: retained earning is preferred to external sources of funds and profitability allows 
firms to use retained earnings rather than debt and equity to finance investment. However, the 
impact of profitability on economic growth depends on how we analyse the debt to equity 
ratio. 
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If we consider that the debt to equity ratio is a mere outcome, or to put it in another way if we 
assume that this ratio is only observed ex post and does not influence the investment decision, 
then firms grouped in cluster 3 that are more profitable and less indebted than firms of other 
clusters would have a higher capacity to expand. If this capacity is not used due to a lack of 
profitable projects, then firms that are more profitable would be less indebted than firms of 
other clusters with similar growth rates. A low debt to equity ratio correlated with higher 
profitability would characterize the model to be followed in a Myers and Majluf world. 
If we consider that the debt to equity ratio is a constraint, in other words, if the mix of retained 
earnings and debt is analysed as a standard to be followed or a target fixed ex ante, before 
investment is decided, then the growth predictions are quite different. Preference for self-
financing entails that investment becomes highly sensitive to the levels of cash flow and 
retained earnings and, in certain cases, it entails that new profitable projects will not be 
funded. If this second hypothesis is not rejected, firms grouped in this cluster may be self-
rationed. To finance a given amount of investment, firms constrained by this ratio would 
require a higher level of retained earnings than firms that do not face financial constraints. An 
additional constraint comes from the autonomy pattern. A given percentage of stable 
resources has to remain liquid, in the case of an unexpected event resulting in the need for 
additional liquidity. With such hypotheses, we cannot predict that the capacity to expand is 
higher for firms belonging to this cluster than for the others and we cannot analyse the cluster 
three as a model to be followed. 
Summarizing the first results, differences across countries can be observed. It suggests that 
the notion of national financial systems remains relevant. We do not find one model to be 
followed but two ways of achieving financial profitability, either by leverage (Germany) or by 
higher economic profitability (France), we also find an atypical cluster, the ‘Italian’ complex 
set of variables. Relationships between growth and financial variables are complex and 
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evidence does not allow us to conclude in favour of one pattern over another one when 
corporate growth matters. 
 
5. Have financial patterns changed during the 1990s ?  
 
In this section, we address the question of whether or not financial systems have converged 
and explore the thesis of a joint evolution by countries that would lead to disintermediation, 
with banks losing importance to the markets.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a tendency toward grouping around a common financial pattern. 
This hypothesis can be tested with PCA and cluster analysis. Figures 2 and 3 show that during 
the whole period under review, 1991-2001, there is a general tendency for keeping the same 
financial pattern in each country. In five countries out of seven, manufacturing firms of the 
same country are permanently projected in the same quadrant shaped by the first pair of 
factorial axes. This evidence testifies to the permanency of differences across national 
financial systems. In two countries firms experienced significant changes: Spain and Sweden. 
In this latter case, changes are easily noticeable on figures 2 and 3; Swedish firms were 
classified as debt-based in 1991 (North-West quadrant) and as autonomy-based in 2001 
(North-East quadrant). We have performed supplementary data analyses that bear out the lack 
of evidence in favour of the convergence hypothesis. Individual data broken down by sub-
periods were plotted on the figures obtained by projecting the first pair of factorial axes7. In 
the case of a dramatic process of convergence, at the beginning of the period (1991-1993) 
                                                 
7 These figures are not displayed in this paper, given space limitation. 
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individual data would be highly spread out whilst at the end of the period (1999-2001)8 
individual data would be concentrated around the barycentre. PCA data are always spread out, 
there is no tendency toward grouping around a common financial pattern. Evidence do not 
testify to hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a general tendency across countries toward less bank financing. 
We also aim to assess the belief in a process of disintermediation. Do data provide evidence 
of this process? If any, is it more obvious in bank-based countries than in market-based ones?  
In order to judge whether the role of banks may have changed during the last decade of the 
XX th  century, we employ a graphical method as a first step and carry out an econometrical 
test as a second step. Hypothesis 2 is tested with two intermediation ratios: long-term bank 
debt over total balance-sheet9 and short-term bank debt over total balance-sheet. As we admit 
that corporate size matters, these two ratios are calculated for each size of firm.  
 
                                                 
8 These three years sub-periods have been selected to reduce the impact of the business cycle on corporate 
financing pattern. 
9 Small Austrian firms are not in the sample. Data are not available for German firms after 2000, the long-term 
bank debt ratio is not available for Swedish firms, and the short-term bank debt ratio is not available for Swedish 
firms after 1996.   
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Fig. 4.1:  
Long-term bank debt rate, 
small manufacturing firms 
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Fig. 4.2 :  
Long-term bank debt rate, 
medium size manufacturing firms  
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Fig. 4.3:  
Long-term bank debt rate, 
large manufacturing firms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1:  
Short-term bank debt rate, 
small manufacturing firms  
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Fig. 5.2:  
Short-term bank debt rate, 
medium-sized manufacturing firms  
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Fig. 5.3:  
Short-term bank debt rate, 
large manufacturing firms  
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Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 indicate how the rate of long-term bank debt has evolved over eleven 
years (manufacturing industries only). They show that this intermediation ratio is almost 
constant in many cases. Yet in the case of large Austrian, French, and Spanish firms a decline 
can be observed at the mid-period or at the beginning of the 1990s, but this trend was reversed 
during the recovery of 1999-2000 in Austria and France. Figures 5.1 to 5.3 indicate how the 
rate of short-term bank debt has evolved. They show that this intermediation ratio has fallen 
in a few cases. The decline is quite noticeable in the case of small Italian firms and large 
Spanish firms, two countries where firms used to rely heavily on this source of funding. The 
decrease of this second intermediation ratio in Italy and Spain indicates that the overdraft 
pattern is declining. Figures 4 and 5 suggest that the hypothesis 2 should be reformulated in 
the following way: there is no common tendency toward less bank financing but there is a 
certain general tendency to reduce the use of short-term bank debt.  
Now, we can come back to the assumption of convergence. According to this hypothesis, we 
can expect that the decreasing role of banks should have been higher in the 1990s in those 
countries where firms were more indebted at the beginning of the decade so that the standard 
deviation of intermediation ratios between countries should have been  reduced during the 
period.  
In order to test for the presence of a trend in the standard deviation series, we have carried out 
a regression against time trend on the following form: 
i
ts = aT + C  
where its  is the standard deviation of intermediation ratio i on year t for the group of 
countries, T is a time variable, C is a constant term. A negative coefficient would indicate a 
tightening dispersion of the ratio and would testify in favour of convergence for the group. 
The significant results10 of these regressions are reported in table 4.1 and table 4.2. 
                                                 
10 Results are significant when PR>|t| is equal to or minor than 0.05. 
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Table 4.1 : Time trend regression – standard deviation of long-term bank debt rate 
(six countries, manufacturing and all sectors) 
 
Manufacturing industry only 
Size 
 
A C 
 
Large size 
 
 
 
0.03 
PR>|t| =0.03 
 
 
-63.22 
PR>|t| =0.003 
 
 
 
 
All sectors 
Size 
 
a C 
 
Small size 
 
 
Large size 
 
 
 
0.35 
PR>|t| <0.0156 
 
-0.21 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
 
-701.02 
PR>|t| =0.016 
 
423.65 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
 
Table 4.2 : Time trend regression – standard deviation of short-term bank debt rate 
(six countries, manufacturing and all sectors) 
 
Manufacturing industry only 
Size 
 
a C 
 
All sizes 
 
 
Small size 
 
 
Medium size 
 
 
Large size 
 
 
 
 
-0.13 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
-0.22 
PR>|t| =0.0011 
 
-0.05 
PR>|t| =0.05 
 
-0.12 
PR>|t| =0.0007 
 
 
259.21 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
445.3 
PR>|t| =0.001 
 
113.68 
PR>|t| =0.04 
 
234.10 
PR>|t| =0.0006 
 
 
 
All sectors 
Size 
 
a C 
 
All sizes 
 
 
Small size 
 
 
Medium size 
 
 
Large size 
 
 
 
 
-0.14 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
-0.22 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
-0.08 
PR>|t| =0.0008 
 
-0.12 
PR>|t| =0.0019 
 
 
288.96 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
443.19 
PR>|t| <0.0001 
 
170.51 
PR>|t| =0.0006 
 
251.56 
PR>|t| =0.0017 
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The standard deviation of long-term bank debt rate shows no significant trend (at the 5 percent 
level) for all sectors, for manufacturing industries only and all sizes (table 4.1). It is only for 
large firms, in the case of all sectors as a whole, that dispersion has been reduced (the value of 
the coefficient is negative). But in two other cases, the standard deviation ratio has a positive 
coefficient, which indicates a higher dispersion of this intermediation ratio. At this stage of 
empirical analysis, hypothesis 2 is clearly not valid. 
However, the standard deviation of short-term bank debt rate shows a strongly significant 
trend and a negative coefficient for all sectors as a whole and for manufacturing industries 
only, whatever the size (table 4.2). Econometrical tests testify to the presence of a trend with 
regard to this second ratio.  
Standard deviation tests carried out with these two ratios support the view that the observed 
countries have experienced a specific process of convergence toward less bank financing: 
cross-country differences in the use of short-term bank debt became less important whilst 
differences in the use of long-term bank debt remained unchanged.  
Figures and econometrical tests indicate that the banking function of allocating liquidity for 
day-to-day business and providing a certain liquidity insurance to their clients is declining. In 
the case of SMEs, a decrease of short-term bank debt cannot be explained by a higher use of 
the market debt. Indeed, short-term market debt is in its infancy in Continental European 
countries and is an effective alternative source of funds only for a very limited number of 
large multinational companies11. Evidence suggests that changes have been pushed by banks 
                                                 
11 In Germany, Spain, and Italy short-term market debt is marginal (less than 1.5 % of total financial debt in 
2001), while it is only significant in France (5.0 % of total financial debt in 2001) (Pansard, 2003). 
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rather than pulled by markets. In the EU observed countries, the current trend, if any, is more 
toward stable resources and self-financing than toward financial markets, as suppliers of 
funds. The widely spread belief in a common move away from banks toward financial 
markets has no empirical basis, as regards corporate financial patterns.  
New reasons for changes in corporate financial patterns have to be taken into account, in 
order to explain these outcomes. The evolution of relationships between firms and banks in 
each country becomes an important factor of evolution, along with the process of 
globalisation of financial markets and the European financial integration. Banks are moving 
away from the traditional function of providing capital, for several reasons. The steady stream 
of bank mergers in European countries throughout the 1990s may have destabilised 
customers-suppliers relationships. In some European countries, firms are changing their 
behaviour, destabilising bank relationships. Financial managers demand funds to several 
banks, choosing the best offer, regardless of the importance of maintaining relationships with 
a particular bank. These changes may have undermined the informational advantage of banks 
and corporate managers’ confidence in the liquidity promise given by banks. Lending tends to 
become standardized and detailed knowledge of borrowers activity is partly lost (Bartzolas, 
2004). Furthermore, Basel I, which makes credit to non-financial firms less attractive for 
banks, has favoured a decrease of the role of banks as lenders; the implementation of Basel II 
is likely to reinforce this strategic behaviour. Yet there is little evidence of credit rationing 
even for SMEs, as this behaviour cannot easily be demonstrated (Wagenvoort, 2003). Our 
empirical analysis does not give evidence of a common trend of disintermediation, when 
banks act as long-term lenders. In France - a financial system that is no more largely bank-
based - during the boom of the new economy (1998-2000), the role of banks as long-term 
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lenders has increased for larger firms, that have the biggest capacity to choose among 
different sources of funds. Hence, we can predict that in the beginning of the XXI st  century, 
changes would affect particularly short-term bank debt, as banks are moving away from their 
specific function of providing working capital. 
Coming back to our analytical framework, we suggest that the financial pattern which 
characterizes the overdraft pattern (cluster 2) is not sustainable if the customer-supplier 
relationship is destabilised. On the opposite, the pattern called autonomy-based should not be 
analysed as an atypical case but as a new one, although there is no corresponding cluster; in 
an autonomy-based pattern, short-term bank debt is no more regarded as an important source 
of funds and stable resources are preferred.  
Little attention has been given to banks as short-term lenders in the literature. Only long-term 
debt is seen as being important, because of its contribution to the funding of investment and 
hence growth. However the funding of working capital matters. It matters mostly for SMEs, 
because of their difficulties in issuing debt on European financial markets. It matters 
especially for young and innovative SMEs, because the working capital is highly irregular. 
Financially sound firms with profitable projects of investment and employment may go 
bankrupt because they cannot finance an unexpected increase of the working capital triggered 
by a sudden rise in demand.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In order to study the corporate financial patterns in the EU countries, we have followed an 
original framework. We consider that financial patterns are better analysed when two 
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corporate abilities are taken into account: the capacity to finance risky investment projects 
and the fitness to be flexible, i.e. to react to unexpected events that can be good or bad for the 
future of the firm. To achieve the first ability, corporate funding can rely either on equity or 
long-term debt. As regards the second ability, financing comes from stable resources or 
short-term external debt mainly supplied by banks. As our classification is governed by two 
pairs of alternative sources of funds, we get four virtual financial patterns.  
This analytical framework allows to typify corporate financial patterns. The PCA and the 
cluster analysis validate its explanatory power, if data is limited to manufacturing industries 
only. The cluster analysis provides evidence of differences across countries. We find that 
countries can be grouped into three clusters called by referring to our taxonomy of financial 
patterns: debt-oriented, overdraft-oriented, and autonomy- and equity-oriented. Because of 
the complex relationship between growth and financial variables, we cannot single out one 
model for European firms and accept the idea that distinct financial models may coexist in 
the foreseeable future in Continental Europe. The pattern called autonomy-oriented cannot be 
observed by the cluster analysis, however this pattern characterized by a low rate of short-
term bank debt is sustainable and may be followed by a growing number of European firms 
in the foreseeable future. We can expect such an evolution, as the cluster analysis shows that 
Swedish firms are moving toward this pattern, and also because econometrical tests reveal 
the existence of a common trend toward disintermediation of short-term financing. 
Indeed, econometrical tests lead to a strong and original conclusion. On the average 
European firms have not decreased their reliance on long-term bank financing, but the rate of 
short-term debt has been reduced. We can conclude that firms have substituted stable 
resources and, therefore, cash holdings to short-term bank debt. This evolution reflects the 
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decrease in the liquidity insurance supplied by banks. Evidence testifies to the decline of one 
of the most traditional functions provided by banks. For centuries banks have been the 
financial companion of economic exchanges, allocating short-term loans for current business 
and providing a certain liquidity insurance to their clients, in case of contingencies. The 
recent development of financial markets and several other factors have oriented banks to 
move away from this classical function toward new patterns of intermediation and new 
functions. A simple shift from banks to capital markets is not the essence of changes in the 
observed countries, although there is a general tendency on the part of non-financial firms to 
reduce the role of banks as short-term lenders. Changes in corporate financial patterns have 
been pushed by banks rather than pulled by financial markets. We predict that the 
relationships between financial institutions and firms will become more long-term and more 
‘arm’s length’. 
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Table A.1 provides an overview of the main empirical researches on national financial systems in Europe that 
compare the corporate sources of funds (studies starting in 1991 or later). Evidence does not lead to conclusive 
outcomes as regards the rate of indebtedness. Indeed, the assessment of leverage is highly sensitive to the 
selected ratio and sample. For instance, leverage is higher (smaller) for German firms than French ones when the 
numerator includes (excludes) provisions (Rajan and Zingales, 1994). As large public firms and small unquoted 
ones do not share the same financial pattern, especially in the case of Germany, international comparison is 
highly influenced by the weight of large firms in the sample; the mean value that reflects the behaviour of  the 
largest firms and the median that is influenced by the smallest ones lead to distinct results (Delbreil et al., 1997). 
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Appendix 2  
Presentation of the Bach database 
Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised (BACH) is a database containing harmonised annual 
accounts statistics of non-financial enterprises for 11 European countries, Japan and the United States. The 
database was set up in 1987. 
Harmonization  
Accounts are "harmonised" through a common layout for balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, statements of 
investments and statements of depreciation. They are based on the Fourth Commission Directive (78/660/EEC of 
July 1978). This directive does not aim to achieve complete standardization of accounting rules; indeed several 
options remain open for individual Member States. Nevertheless, the main goal of the harmonization work of the 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs and the European Committee of Central Balance-sheet 
(ECCB) has been to achieve a relatively comparable framework for the statistical presentation of company 
accounts. The specific nature of national accounting methods and the difficulty of drawing up accounting 
documents a posteriori using a common layout thus restrict the degree of data harmonization. Harmonization is 
therefore still incomplete at the international level and even at the European level. Nevertheless, BACH is the 
most advanced publicly available database for comparisons between the financial structures and performances of 
SMEs and those of large companies.  
Representativeness 
The national bodies responsible for centralizing balance-sheet data supply the Commission with aggregate 
information. The Commission assumes that the samples used are representative as the data is published and 
analysed by those bodies.  
Countries  
The BACH database covers 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States. The present analysis takes into account 7 
countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. The other countries have been excluded 
for different reasons: Finland and Denmark owing to missing data, the Netherlands owing to consolidated data, 
Portugal owing to the lack of data broken down according to the common size criterion between 1991 and 1995. 
Data from the United States, and Japan were not available.  
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Size 
A distinction is made between three categories of firms :  
- Small companies with a turnover of less than  7 millions euros ; 
- Medium-sized companies with a turnover between  7 millions and  40 millions euros ; 
- Large companies with a turnover in excess of  40 millions euros.  
Sectors  
Data have been grouped together in an aggregate common nomenclature comprising 23 sectors or sub-sectors. 
Sector 1 = ENERGY AND WATER (including refining industry); Sector 2 = MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY; Sector 3 = BUILDING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING; Sector 4 = TRADE; Sector 5 = 
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION; Sector 6 = OTHER SERVICES. 
Manufacturing industry is broken down into three sub-sectors: Intermediate products (21), Investment goods and 
consumer durables (22), Non-durable consumption goods (23). Trade is broken down into four sub-sectors : 
wholesale trade, recovery services (41), sales of motor vehicules, wholesale and retail trade (42), retail trade 
(43), hotels-restaurants (44). The largest sample includes sectors 1, 3, 5, and 6, and the sub-sectors 21, 22, 23, 
41, 42, 43, and 44. The smallest includes only the three sub-sectors of manufacturing industry. 
Accounting Data  
The BACH accounting layout comprises a balance sheet and a profit and loss account. Assets and liabilities are 
given as a percentage of the total balance sheet. Profit and loss account items and statements of investment and 
depreciation are presented as a percentage of the turnover. In addition, the total balance sheet, the value added 
and the turnover are given in national currency units. The financial statements are not consolidated for the seven 
selected countries. 
Principal Component Analysis 
PCA is used mainly to sort out individual data. However, the corporate data available from BACH is group data 
and not microdata, i.e there is only one average figure for each country*year*size* sector category and balance-
sheet item. Hence it is implicitly assumed that all enterprises in one category behave like the average within a 
given category. To put it in another way, the average firm is assumed to be a representative one. 
Cluster Analysis 
CA sorts the output data according to each of the large components and permits the grouping of data that is most 
similar (a standard iterated algorithm is used to minimize the sum of squared distances from the cluster means). 
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The observations are divided into clusters so that every observation belongs to only one cluster. The number of 
clusters is chosen according to frequency so that the number of observations in each cluster is not too small. 
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Appendix 3 : PCA (Manufacturing Industry, only 1991-2001) 
CORRELATION MATRIX  
 
     |          EQUI   LEVE   RESE   FIDE   OVER   AUTO   NONF 
-----+------------------------------------------------- 
EQUITY |        1.00 
LEVERAGE|      -0.80   1.00 
RESERVE |       0.20  -0.01   1.00 
FIDEBTSTRUCT|  -0.14  -0.26  -0.20   1.00 
OVERDRAFT |    -0.30   0.01  -0.28   0.79   1.00 
AUTONOMY |      0.26  -0.09   0.16  -0.37  -0.58   1.00 
NONFIDEBTRATE|  0.11  -0.36  -0.10  -0.04  -0.26   0.52   1.00 
-----+------------------------------------------------- 
 
CHART OF THE FIRST SEVEN EIGEN VALUES  
 
+--------+------------+----------+---------- +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| NUMBER    EIGEN     |PERCENTAGE| CUMULATED !                                                                               | 
|        |   VALUE    |          |           |                                                                                  | 
+--------+------------+----------+---------- +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|    1   |   2.6047   |   37.21  |   37.21   | ******************************************************************************** | 
|    2   |   1.8170   |   25.96  |   63.17   | ********************************************************                         | 
|    3   |   1.2094   |   17.28  |   80.44   | **************************************                                           | 
|    4   |   0.7643   |   10.92  |   91.36   | ************************                                                         | 
|    5   |   0.3953   |    5.65  |   97.01   | *************                                                                    | 
|    6   |   0.1638   |    2.34  |   99.35   | ******                                                                           | 
|    7   |   0.0456   |    0.65  |  100.00   | **                                                                               | 
+--------+------------+----------+----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
POSITION OF INTERVALS 
 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*------------+---------------* 
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*---------+---------*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *-----+------*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4 . . . . . . . . *---+----*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5 *-+-* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
COORDINATES ON COMPONENTS 1 AND 2 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
ACTIVE   VARIABLES          | COORDINATES      CORRELATIONS  
----------------------------+----------------+-------------- 
     -                      |    1      2    |    1     2    
----------------------------+----------------+-------------- 
EQUI - equity               |   0.59  -0.61  |  0.59 -0.61   
LEVE - leverage             |  -0.35   0.90  | -0.35  0.90   
RESE - reservrate           |   0.35   0.17  |  0.35  0.17   
FIDE - fidebtstruct         |  -0.65  -0.60  | -0.65 -0.60   
OVER - overdraft             |  -0.85  -0.37  | -0.85 -0.37   
AUTO - autonomy             |   0.77   0.08  |  0.77  0.08   
NONF - nonfidebtrate        |   0.50  -0.30  |  0.50 -0.30   
 
SUPPLEMENTARY VARIABLES     |    COORDINATES_ | CORRELATIONS| 
----------------------------+-------------------------------- 
                            |    1      2     |    1     2    
----------------------------+-------------------------------- 
CASH - cashflowcap          |   0.43   0.11   |  0.43  0.11  
ROE  - roe                  |   0.00   0.56   |  0.00  0.56  
GROS - grosprofita          |   0.32  -0.14   |  0.32 -0.14  
MARK - markup               |   0.17  -0.22   |  0.17 -0.22  
FIXA - fixdasset            |  -0.03   0.11   | -0.03  0.11  
WORK - workingk             |  -0.36   0.05   | -0.36  0.05  
FINA - financialcharges     |  -0.39  -0.09   | -0.39 -0.09  
SOLV - solvency             |   0.22  -0.10   |  0.22 -0.10  
APPI - appint               |  -0.15  -0.07   | -0.15 -0.07  
----------------------------+------------------------------------+-------------------------------+------------------------------- 
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Appendix 4: Cluster Analysis (Manufacturing Industry only, 1991-2001)  
DESCRIPTION OF PARTITION  
DESCRIPTION FROM THE CUT ‘a’ OF THE TREE IN 3 CLUSTERS 
 
CLUSTER  1 /  3 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| V.TEST | PROBA |     MEAN          | STANDARD DEVIATION|                    VARIABLES                                          | 
|        |       |  CLUSTER  SAMPLE  | CLUSTER   SAMPLE  |                                                                  IDEN | 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|                 CLUSTER  1 /  3       ( WEIGHT  =   190.00)                                                                aa1a | 
 
                                                                                                                                | 
|  16.42 | 0.000 |    54.92    42.10 |     9.23    12.81 |   6.leverage                                                     LEVE | 
|  10.03 | 0.000 |    32.19    25.33 |    13.88    11.22 |  13.roe                                                          ROE  | 
|   4.70 | 0.000 |     3.40     1.33 |     5.67     7.23 |   9.ovedraft                                                     OVER | 
|   4.53 | 0.000 |    31.50    28.19 |    18.70    11.99 |  17.workingk                                                     WORK | 
|   3.65 | 0.000 |    55.74    51.78 |    21.46    17.78 |   7.reservrate                                                   RESE | 
|   3.30 | 0.000 |    45.39    40.45 |    33.17    24.60 |  16.fixdasset                                                    FIXA | 
|        |       |                   |                   |                                                                       | 
|  -2.55 | 0.005 |    13.27    14.82 |     9.51     9.95 |  20.appint                                                       APPI | 
|  -2.90 | 0.002 |     9.08     9.46 |     2.40     2.17 |  15.markup                                                       MARK | 
|  -5.10 | 0.000 |    13.80    15.11 |     4.68     4.22 |  14.grosprofita                                                  GROS | 
|  -7.11 | 0.000 |   -17.58   -13.40 |    10.53     9.65 |  10.autonomy                                                     AUTO | 
| -10.87 | 0.000 |    28.10    33.61 |     7.80     8.32 |   5.equity                                                       EQUI | 
| -18.68 | 0.000 |    29.47    44.11 |     8.17    12.86 |  11.nonfidebtrate                                                NONF | 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                CLUSTER   1 / 3                                                                                    
V.TEST  PROBA     CLUSTER (%)  SAMPLE (%)                                                                                          
 
|  12.21 ! 0.000 ! 86.67     ! 14.02      ! GERMANY    !       country                                                            
!  11.32 ! 0.000 ! 92.42     ! 10.28      ! AUSTRIA    !       country                                                            
!   4.30 ! 0.000 ! 50.00     ! 14.02      ! SWEDEN     !       country                                                            
!   2.33 ! 0.010 ! 35.56     ! 35.05      ! SIZE = 2   !       size                                                               
 
 
 
CLUSTER 2 /  3 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| V.TEST | PROBA |     MEAN          | STANDARD DEVIATION|                    VARIABLES                                          | 
|        |       |  CLUSTER  SAMPLE  | CLUSTER   SAMPLE  |                                                                  IDEN | 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|                 CLUSTER  2 /  3       ( WEIGHT =   167.00 )                                                               aa2a | 
|                                                                                                                                | 
|  19.67 | 0.000 |   139.76    69.85 |    39.67    53.35 |   8.fidebtstruct                                                 FIDE | 
|  15.80 | 0.000 |     8.94     1.33 |     3.93     7.23 |   9.ovedraft                                                     OVER | 
|   8.54 | 0.000 |     4.80     3.25 |     3.36     2.73 |  18.financialcharges                                             FINA | 
|   5.23 | 0.000 |    32.37    28.19 |     5.01    11.99 |  17.workingk                                                     WORK | 
|   4.50 | 0.000 |    17.80    14.82 |    11.19     9.95 |  20.appint                                                       APPI | 
|   2.86 | 0.002 |    46.56    44.11 |     5.28    12.86 |  11.nonfidebtrate                                                NONF | 
|        |       |                   |                   |                                                                       | 
|  -2.46 | 0.007 |    14.42    15.11 |     3.22     4.22 |  14.grosprofita                                                  GROS | 
|  -5.48 | 0.000 |    45.30    51.78 |    14.33    17.78 |   7.reservrate                                                   RESE | 
|  -6.76 | 0.000 |     5.64     7.19 |     2.24     3.45 |  12.cashflowcap                                                  CASH | 
|  -9.64 | 0.000 |   -19.60   -13.40 |     5.78     9.65 |  10.autonomy                                                     AUTO | 
| -10.13 | 0.000 |    33.46    42.10 |     9.68    12.81 |   6.leverage                                                     LEVE | 
| -10.44 | 0.000 |    17.53    25.33 |     6.72    11.22 |  13.roe                                                          ROE  | 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
 
                                CLUSTER   2 / 3                                                                                    
V.TEST     PROBA  CLUSTER (%)  SAMPLE (%)                                                                                          
 
|  17.12 ! 0.000 ! 97.98     ! 15.42      ! ITALY      !       country                                                            
!  10.21 ! 0.000 ! 70.71     ! 15.42      ! SPAIN      !       country                                                            
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CLUSTER  3 /  3 
 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| V.TEST | PROBA |     MEAN          | STANDARD DEVIATION|                    VARIABLES                                          | 
|        |       |  CLUSTER  SAMPLE  | CLUSTER   SAMPLE  |                                                                  IDEN | 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|                 CLUSTER  3 /  3       ( WEIGHT =   285.00)                                                                aa3a | 
|                                                                                                                                | 
|  15.06 | 0.000 |    -6.96   -13.40 |     6.38     9.65 |  10.autonomy                                                     AUTO | 
|  14.63 | 0.000 |    52.43    44.11 |     9.81    12.86 |  11.nonfidebtrate                                                NONF | 
|   9.68 | 0.000 |    37.16    33.61 |     6.51     8.32 |   5.equity                                                       EQUI | 
|   6.87 | 0.000 |    16.40    15.11 |     4.05     4.22 |  14.grosprofita                                                  GROS | 
|   6.01 | 0.000 |     8.11     7.19 |     3.99     3.45 |  12.cashflowcap                                                  CASH | 
|   3.21 | 0.001 |     0.65     0.60 |     0.44     0.36 |  19.solvency                                                     SOLV | 
|        |       |                   |                   |                                                                       | 
|  -6.14 | 0.000 |    38.63    42.10 |     9.62    12.81 |   6.leverage                                                     LEVE | 
|  -6.83 | 0.000 |     2.43     3.25 |     1.15     2.73 |  18.financialcharges                                             FINA | 
|  -8.79 | 0.000 |    23.52    28.19 |     6.04    11.99 |  17.workingk                                                     WORK | 
| -15.45 | 0.000 |    33.41    69.85 |    26.19    53.35 |   8.fidebtstruct                                                 FIDE | 
| -18.27 | 0.000 |    -4.51     1.33 |     4.04     7.23 |   9.ovedraft                                                     OVER | 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
                                CLUSTER   3 / 3                                                                                    
V.TEST  PROBA     CLUSTER (%)  SAMPLE (%)                                                                                          
 
|  13.30 ! 0.000 ! 100       ! 15.42      ! FRANCE     !       country                                                            
!  11.90 ! 0.000 ! 95.96     ! 15.42      ! BELGIUM    !       country                                                            
 
